4-6pm May 22 2014, Annexe, Building R, Stadcampus, Centre for Philosophical Psychology, University of Antwerp
Abstract: I will examine three theories according to which emotions are perceptions: (1) Jesse Prinz’s view in Gut Reactions, (2) the “neo-sentimentalist” view that emotions are perceptions of evaluative properties, and (3) a view which is sometimes implied although (I believe) never stated by J.J. Gibson, the view that emotions are perceptions of what we might call “emotional affordances.” I will argue that if we combine the Gibsonian view of affordances with the Jamesian theory of emotion we end up with a conception of emotion that is consistent with the view I have argued for in “Startle” (1995), Deeper than Reason (2005), and elsewhere, but which also provides a more helpful account of what I have called “bodily” or “non-cognitive” appraisals. I will conclude with some brief examples from aesthetics.
Upcoming workshops and conferences:
May 21: Workshop on the role of emotions in music (co-organized with the University of Ghent)
June 10-11: Conference on nonpropositional and imagistic content
June 25-26: Symposium with Philip Kitcher
More info: http://webh01.ua.ac.be/bence.nanay/paw.htm